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Order in the Court: Challenging Judges
Who Incarcerate Pregnant, Substance-
Dependent Defendants to Protect
Fetal Health
By BARRIE L. BECKER*
Introduction
Many commentators have analyzed prosecutors' use of child abuse,
drug trafficking, and other statutes to criminalize drug use during preg-
nancy.' Likewise, studies have noted a growing trend among legislators
to pass laws explicitly criminalizing drug use during pregnancy.2 These
authors have addressed complex constitutional and policy issues regard-
ing such state action. None of the commentators, however, has signifi-
cantly addressed another form of state action: the growing trend among
judges to use the sentencing phase of criminal trials to incarcerate preg-
nant substance-dependent women, in an attempt to protect fetal health,
absent statutes explicitly creating a "fetal abuse" crime.
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A., Yale University, 1987. I dedicate this Note to Ellen
Barry, Margaret Crosby, and Minnie Thomas; their inspiring accomplishments have helped
women and their families stay healthy and together. I would also like to thank my family for
their unwavering support.
1. The term "drug use" as used in this Note refers to both illegal substances, such as
cocaine, marijuana, and heroin, and legal substances, such as alcohol, tobacco, and prescrip-
tion drugs. Both categories of drugs can harm fetal health and both have been cited by judges
incarcerating pregnant women. See infra notes 4-12 (regarding jailing pregnant women for
illegal drug use) and notes 14-15 (regarding jailing pregnant women for alcohol use) and ac-
companying text. Since women "who use cocaine while pregnant are also more likely to
smoke cigarettes and marijuana, consume alcohol, and have poor nutrition, it is difficult to
ascertain how much of the effect is due to cocaine and how much to the other factors, which
are also associated with low birth weight, prematurity, and small head circumference." Barry
Zuckerman, Drug-Exposed Infants: Understanding the Medical Risk, 1 THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN 26, 27 (1991).
2. For discussions of prosecutorial and statutory attempts to criminalize both legal and
illegal behavior during pregnancy, see Dawn Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs: Governmental
Regulation of Pregnant Women's Lives 4fter Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 179 (1989); Molly
McNulty, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implications of Punishing Pregnant
Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277 (1989); Kary
Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.. 278 (1990); Memorandum
from the ACLU Women's Rights Project (September 16, 1991) (on file with the Hastings Con-
stitutional Law Quarterly).
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This Note focuses on the emerging trend of sentencing women to jail
or prison because they use drugs while pregnant, without any statute de-
fining such behavior as criminal. The Note addresses the question: Does
a judge abuse sentencing discretion and violate constitutional rights by
incarcerating a woman, who would normally face mere fines or probation
for the charge against her, when that judge bases the incarceration deci-
sion on his or her belief that the woman's fetus will be protected from
potentially harmful drug exposure while the woman is in prison?
Part I of the Note outlines the scope of the problem, focusing on the
Washington, D.C., United States v. Vaughn3 case. Part II explores the
public policy questions that arise when a judge attempts to protect a fetus
by incarcerating the woman carrying it. Part IIIA examines the availa-
bility of appellate review of sentences. Part IIIB first presents constitu-
tional arguments which justify review of the sentencing of pregnant drug
users, and then specifically analyzes due process, privacy, equal protec-
tion, and cruel and unusual punishment challenges to incarceration of
pregnant, drug-dependent women. Part IV reviews different states' alter-
native approaches to sentencing the drug-addicted offender. This Note
concludes that there are effective means to combat the tragic problem of
in utero drug exposure without sacrificing the constitutional rights of
women.
I. Discriminatory Sentencing of Pregnant Substance-Dependent
Women
The U.S. v. Vaughn case4 was a widely publicized example of a
judge using the sentencing phase of a criminal trial to criminalize a de-
fendant's substance dependence during pregnancy. Vaughn was arrested
in 1988 in Washington, D.C., for forging $721.98 in checks belonging to
her employer. Vaughn, a first-time offender, pled guilty to second degree
theft, an offense punishable by up to $1000 fine and/or one year in jail.
Before sentencing, Judge Wolf determined that Vaughn tested positive
for cocaine. Although she denied drug use, Vaughn informed the court
that she was six months pregnant. Judge Wolf sentenced Vaughn to six
months in prison, stating that he was doing so "to be sure she would not
be released until her pregnancy was concluded.., because of... concern
for the unborn child .... I
In sentencing Vaughn for the duration of her pregnancy, Judge
Wolf stated that protection of the public was an acknowledged purpose
of criminal law enforcement. He stated his belief that the "'public' in-
cluded an unborn child and the taxpaying public who would undoubt-
3. DAILY WASH. LAW. REP., March 7, 1989, at 441 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 1988).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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edly have to pay for.., a child who could have severe and expensive
problems at birth ... ." In addition, Judge Wolf stated that many of his
colleagues on the bench reported similarly sentencing pregnant drug
abusers, sometimes stating their reasons on the record. 7 He then admit-
ted that Vaughn had been treated differently than if she were a man in
this case, but argued that "a convicted rapist is treated differently from a
woman."8 Although "most judges of this court would probably impose a
sentence of probation for most defendants with a first-time misdemeanor
conviction," Judge Wolf argued that this was "not an invariable rule."9
He noted that his authority to sentence her as he did came from the
illegal nature of the drug which caused Vaughn to commit "her crimes,"
and from his authority to consider "all relevant factors... in imposing
sentence." 1 Judge Wolf concluded that there was no other answer be-
sides jail because Vaughn herself had denied her drug problem to the
court.II
There is evidence that judges in other jurisdictions also use the sen-
tencing phase of a trial to punish drug use during pregnancy. In Oak-
land, California, Superior Court Judge Stanley Golde reports: "If a
woman is on a narcotics charge and is using narcotics, I send her to jail
and, if the child is born, then I release them."' 2 This occurs despite the
fact that, like Washington, D.C., California has no statute criminalizing
prenatal drug use. Despite much criticism of his practice, Judge Golde
defends jail sentences, as opposed to drug treatment, for pregnant women
because he believes space in drug treatment facilities "is limited at best,
and they're basically total failures" because there is still access to
drugs.' 3
Tribal judges reportedly use preventive incarceration to keep preg-
nant Native American women who live on reservations from drinking
alcohol. 4 As one Native American health care administrator com-
mented: "If a pregnant woman is brought in for a misdemeanor, she'll
get the maximum amount of jail time.... You're supposed to be sen-
6. Id.
7. I.




12. Boni Brewer, Incarceration of Pregnant Women Doubles at Jail, VALLEY TIMES, June
17, 1990, at Al.
13. Judge Golde's belief that jail is drug-free is refuted by evidence suggesting that drugs
are often easily accessible from a jail cell. See Catherine Foster, Fetal Endangerment Cases
Increase, CHRISTIAN ScL MoNrTOR, Oct. 10, 1989, at 8 (quoting Walter Connolly, Jr., attor-
ney for the National Association for Perinatal Addiction Research and Education, who con-
tended that "jail [is] no place to get away from drugs"); see also Andrew H. Malcolm,
Explosive Drug Use Creating New Underworld in Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1989, at 1.
14. Michele Magar, The Sins of the Mothers, STUDENT LAW., Sept. 1991, at 30, 33.
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tenced for being drunk and disorderly, not for being drunk, disorderly,
and pregnant."15
A nationwide study supports the theory that judges sometimes base
sentences on their own perceptions of gender roles; for many crimes, wo-
men receive more lenient sentences than men, but for certain crimes,
such as child abandonment, women receive harsher sentences than their
male counterparts.1" This difference implies an attitude that women are
worthy of special protection until they violate their expected maternal
role, at which time judges may be particularly punitive.17
Race also factors into the sentencing equation in the area of prose-
cuting and sentencing for drug use during pregnancy. The vast majority
of women prosecuted or sentenced for behavior while pregnant are wo-
men of color.18 A recent study of mandatory reports to law enforcement
officials by Pinellas County, Florida, health providers regarding prenatal
drug use showed that, despite similar rates of drug use among black and
white women, health providers reported black women to authorities at
ten times the rate of white women.19 Similarly, experience shows that
law enforcement officials tend to police publicly-funded hospitals and
clinics, which serve a higher proportion of women of color than private
hospitals."0 Therefore, it seems reasonable to suspect that these same
biases inay lead judges to inquire more actively into the suspected drug
use of pregnant women of color than that of pregnant white women who
come before the court.2
15. Id,
16. Matthew Zingraff & Randall Thomson, Differential Sentencing qf Women and Men in
the U.S.A., 12 INT'L J. Soc. L. 401, 410 (1984).
17. There are no reported cases, to date, in which courts ordered men not to impregnate
drug-using women, or to refrain from reproducing if their own sperm is defective due to drug
use or other exposures. For the impact of male behavior on fetuses, see infra note 140 and
accompanying text.
18. Eighty percent of pregnancy-behavior based prosecutions affect women of color, ac-
cording to Kary Moss of the ACLU Women's Rights Project. Magar, supra note 14, at 33.
This percentage also applies to sentencing practices; Brenda Vaughn, women on reservations,
and most of the women at Santa Rita jail are women of color; see Dorothy E. Roberts, Punish-
ing Drug Addicts W1ho Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104
HARv. L. Rv. 1419, 1421-22 (1991) (Noting that the majority of women criminally punished
for drug use during pregnancy are poor, black, and addicted to crack cocaine. Roberts argues
that poor women of color are the most vulnerable to government monitoring and punishment
because they are the least able to conform to white, middle-class standards of motherhood.).
19. Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy
and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 332 Nnwv ENG. J. MED.
1202 (1990).
20. See Lynn M. Paltrow, When Becoming Pregnant is a Crime, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHics 1,
41 (1990) (describing South Carolina's prosecution program where police have arrested wo-
men attending public hospitals for their deliveries).
21. See infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text (discussing a racial equal protection
analysis in the context of disparate sentences for substance-dependent women of color).
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II. Policy Implications of Incarcerating Pregnant Women
Brenda Vaughn was fortunate because she had access to regular pre-
natal medical visits during her incarceration.22 But many women, whose
cases are not publicized, suffer from a dangerous lack of prenatal care
during incarceration.23 This can be particularly disastrous for pregnant
addicts, who require special, individualized treatment by experienced
counselors. 24
In addition to neglecting pregnant women's prenatal and drug treat-
ment needs, prison officials have been known to deny pregnant prisoners
necessary dietary supplements and rest.25 There is also startling evidence
that some prison staff members, apparently resentful of the "special
treatment" that pregnant women need, assign the women work that re-
quires a great deal of exertion and heavy lifting, even when the women
have a history of miscarriage.2 6 Such occurrences implicate Eighth
Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment.27
In many cases, judges falsely believe that jails and prisons provide
better health care for the woman and the fetus than the care an addicted
woman would obtain on her own. Judge Wolf" may have assumed that
Vaughn would get adequate care during her imprisonment, but he did
not take the opportunity to monitor or order such care, which would
have been a difficult task and perhaps an unconstitutional separation of
powers violation.29 Because of this lack of knowledge and follow-
through by judges, a woman has no guarantee that she will receive ade-
quate care, and she is not free to seek it on her own.
Significant evidence suggests that the primary reason women do not
receive the care they need is not a lack of incentive on their part; rather,
22. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Lewis, Attorney for Brenda Vaughn (Oct. 17, 1990).
23. County Jail Miscarriage Rate 50 Times State Average, YoUTH L. NEWS, Nov.-Dec.
1985, at 4 (In one California county jail, the miscarriage rate after the 20th week of pregnancy
was 73%. Only one in five pregnant inmates delivered a live baby.); see also Brewer, supra
note 12, at A2 (quoting Attorney Ellen Barry reporting that inadequate health care for preg-
nant women at Santa Rita Jail in recent years has resulted in miscarriages and a lawsuit which
effected gradual improvements); Magar, supra note 14, at 34 (noting the lack of prenatal care,
diet, and other services for jailed Native American women).
24. Many imprisoned women who are pregnant and addicted to heroin are forced to with-
draw "cold turkey" (rather than gradually or with a methadone substitute), which can be
extremely dangerous to the fetus, sometimes resulting in miscarriage; see Gerald A. McHugh,
Protection of the Rights of Pregnant Women in Prisons and Detention Facilities, 6 NEw ENG. J.
PRISON L. 231, 241-43 (1980).
25. Susan Stefan, Whose Egg Is It Anyway?: Reproductive Rights of Incarcerated, Institu-
tionalized and Incompetent Women, 13 NOVA L. REV. 405, 442 (1989).
26. Id.
27. See infra notes 145-66 and accompanying text.
28. See supra notes 3-11 and accompanying text (regarding the Vaughn case).
29. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974) (forbidding the delegation of legisla-
tive, judicial, and enforcement powers to a single decision-maker).
240 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 19:235
there is a severe shortage of drug treatment programs which will accept
pregnant women and provide prenatal and drug treatment services which
address their unique needs, such as child-care for young children and a
safe, supportive environment not often found in programs designed for
men.
30
The few specialized drug treatment programs available to pregnant
women are more effective, more humane, and less expensive than incar-
ceration.3 The Central California Women's Facility in Chowchilla
costs, on average, $19,000 annually ($52 daily) per female prisoner.32
This figure does not reflect studies showing that most prisoners in the
nation are recidivists who will incur costs for subsequent incarcerations,
and many are profit-seeking drug users33 who could probably be dealt
with more humanely and economically by the substitution of effective
drug treatment in place of (or in addition to) criminal penalties. This is
especially true for pregnant addicts, many of whom enter the penal sys-
tem because they commit petty offenses rather than violent crimes.34
At least one state has implemented a program to keep prisoners'
families together. The Mother-Infant Care Program, a California alter-
native to prison for low-risk female prisoners, houses women and their
young children at halfway houses which cost approximately $51 (for the
Oakland facility) to $81 (for the San Francisco facility) daily.3" The
value of letting young children stay with their mothers seems
immeasurable.
A punitive approach to pregnant prisoners is irrational when com-
pared to the high success rates claimed by drug treatment centers which
are efficiently designed to respond to the women's individualized needs.
Minnie Thomas, Director of Mandela House residential drug treatment
30. See Karol L. Kumpfer, Treatment Programs for Drug-Abusing Women, 1 THE Fu-
TURE OF CHILDREN 50, 53-55 (1991) (describing extensive research showing the lack of drug
treatment for pregnant women nationwide and the barriers, such as lack of child care, to
entering existing programs); see also Anastasia Toufexis, Innocent fictims, TIME, May 13,
1991, at 56, 59 (citing the lack of appropriate treatment programs as one of the reasons why
only 11% of pregnant drug addicts receive treatment).
31. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (describing unhealthy incarceration
conditions).
32. Telephone Interview with Teena Farmon, Warden, Central California Women's Facil-
ity (Sept. 3, 1991). This figure includes health care services needed by pregnant women, but
not the cost of foster care for children whose mothers are in prison. Farmon reports that most
babies born to prisoners are cared for by relatives, while others go to church groups or foster
care.
33. A research publication of the National District Attorneys Association reports that
approximately seventy percent of males arrested for profit motivated crimes in 1989 tested
positive for drugs. THE MAINLINE, Feb.-Mar. 1991, at 1.
34. Stefan, supra note 25, at 451.
35. Telephone Interview with Sue Olmsted, Executive Director, Volunteers of America
(Sept. 3, 1991) (Volunteers of America administers the Alameda and San Francisco County
Mother Infant Care programs).
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center for pregnant women in Oakland, California, claims that her pro-
gram helps 80% of the residents have drug-free pregnancies and teaches
parenting (older children typically stay with relatives during the wo-
man's treatment) and job skills.36 The typical residential treatment pe-
riod per client, usually six months, costs $10,916.66 ($30 daily), not
including AFDC and other independent benefits clients may receive.37
The San Francisco County Sheriff's Department estimates daily costs per
prisoner (male or female) at $59 per day.38 Department medical person-
nel report that services such as methadone treatment and parenting
classes are available to jailed pregnant women.39 Many health care costs
are absorbed by county hospitals (inmates are ineligible for state Medi-
Cal payments) and are therefore difficult to quantify. 4'
Evidence shows that once women learn that drug use during preg-
nancy is treated as a crime rather than a disease, many of them are
driven away from much-needed health care.4" For example, a highly
publicized California prosecution of a pregnant drug-using woman re-
sulted in an increase of women in that area who received late or no pre-
natal care.42 Those women who did come in for care expressed fears to
health care workers that they would be turned over to the authorities.43
Similar patterns have appeared throughout the country wherever drug
use during pregnancy is criminally punished rather than treated as a cur-
able disease." Because of this, the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, representing 30,000 obstetricians and gynecologists
throughout the United States, opposes legal actions against women who
36. Telephone Interview with Minnie Thomas, Director, Mandela House (Sept. 20, 1990).
37. Ia
38. Telephone Interview with Richard Dyer, Public Information Director, San Francisco
County Sheriff's Dept. (Aug. 30, 1991).
39. Telephone Interview with Dr. Elizabeth Kantor, Medical Director, San Francisco
County Jails (Sept. 5, 1991).
40. Id
41. See Lynn M. Paltrow, Perspective of a Reproductive Rights Attorney, 1 THE FUTURE
OF CHILDREN 85, 87 (1991) (outlining evidence showing that the threats of prosecution and
loss of child custody deter women from seeking drug treatment and prenatal care). Contra
Sonya Steven & Ann S. Ahflstrom, Perspective from a Minnesota County Attorney's Office, 1
THE FuTURE OF CHILDREN 93, 98 (1991) (questioning Paltrow's claim).
42. Declaration of Lydia Roper, State v. Stewart, (San Diego Mun. Ct. 1987) (No.
M508197).
43. Declaration of Cathy Hauer, State v. Stewart, (San Diego Mun. Ct. 1987) (No.
M508197); see also Mary Ann Curry, Nonfinancial Barriers to Prenatal Care, 15 WOMEN &
HEALTH 85, 93 (1989) (identifying physician failure to maintain patient confidentiality as one
of the barriers to pregnant women seeking prenatal care).
44. Drug Treatment Issues Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environ-
ment of the House Comm. on Eneigy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 18-21 (1990) (State-
ment of Lynn M. Paltrow, ACLU Staff Attorney).
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are pregnant and engage in behavior possibly detrimental to the fetus.45
III. Challenging Abuse of Sentencing Discretion
In the Vaughn case," the sentencing judge argued that considera-
tion of the defendant's drug use during pregnancy was within the limits
of his discretionary authority. He described the purposes of sentencing
as retribution, deterrence; rehabilitation, and "protection of the public
from dangerous or aberrant people."'47 He explained that in this case the
public included the fetus and the taxpayers who would be forced to pay
for the problem of drug-exposed infants.48 While the goals of incarcera-
tion are the same in most jurisdictions' statutory schemes,49 Wolf used
his own "fetal rights" theory, which had not been set forth by the legisla-
ture, to incarcerate Vaughn. 0 In so doing, Wolf arguably created a new
crime via sentencing, without statutory authority, thus abusing his sen-
tencing discretion and violating Vaughn's constitutional rights.51
A. Statutory Provisions for Review of Sentences
"Justice is measured in many ways, but to a convicted criminal its
surest measure lies in the fairness of the sentence he receives." 52 Yet this
important phase of a criminal trial carries few restrictions on judicial
discretion.
In reaching the final sentencing decision, a judge typically weighs
many factors within the framework of the five objectives of sentencing:
first, a retributive theory, to fit the punishment to the crime; second, a
general deterrence theory, to deter potential offenders from committing
the same offense; third, a specific deterrence theory, to deter the particu-
lar offender from further criminal activity; fourth, a preventive theory, to
prevent the offender from injuring society again; and finally, a rehabilita-
tive theory, to enable the offender to become a responsible and law-abid-
ing member of society.53
45. A.C.O.G. Committee on Ethics, Committee Opinion: Patient Choice Maternal Fetal
Conflict, Number 55 (Oct. 1987) (on file with the ACLU Women's Rights Project, 132 West 43
Street, New York, NY 10036).
46. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
47. United States v. Vaughn, DAILY WAsH. L. REP., Mar. 7, 1989, at 447 (D.C. Super.
Ct. Aug. 23, 1988).
48. Id
49. See, e.g., CAL. R. C. § 410, § 421 (West 1990) (outlining goals of sentencing and al-
lowable aggravating factors).
50. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
51. See infra section IIIB (discussing constitutional restraints on sentencing).
52. Shepard v. United States, 257 F.2d 293, 294 (6th Cir. 1958).
53. See generally D. A. Thomas, Theories of Punishment in the Court of Criminal Appeal,
27 MOD. L. REv. 546 (1964). For a more detailed analysis, see D. A. Thomas, Sentencing -
The Basic Principles (pt& 1&2), 1967 CRIM. L. REv. (Eng.) 455, 503.
[Vol. 19.235
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Understandably, judges' biases enter into their sentencing decisions,
but when a judge's personal bias leads to an unjust outcome, appellate
review of a sentence may be available. On the federal level, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2106 provides:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction
may afirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, de-
cree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and
may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate
judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to
be had as may be just under the circumstances.5 4
Some federal appellate courts have found sentencing judges to have
abused discretion by highlighting certain factors while refusing to con-
sider others.55 Moreover, some federal district courts have experimented
with sentencing councils which consider proposals by the sentencing
judge and offer nonmandatory recommendations.56
Although the Constitution does not guarantee appellate review of
criminal convictions and sentences, 57 every state allows some form of ap-
peal from a criminal conviction.58 Only some states, however, permit
review of sentences which are challenged on grounds other than denial of
a constitutional right.59
B. Constitutional Bases for Review of Sentences
Notwithstanding the broad discretion granted to judges, sentencing
discretion ends where the Constitution begins. Judicial decisions, includ-
ing sentencing decisions, are considered government actions;6" therefore,
such decisions must not violate the rights protected by the United States
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1991).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1973) (allegation of per-
sonal bias required judge's disqualification, under 28 U.S.C.A. § 144, from presiding over a
selective service violation case after the judge announced that he sentenced all selective service
violators to 30 months in prison); see also United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (9th Cir.
1971) (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949)) ("A trial court which fash-
ions an inflexible practice in sentencing contradicts the judicially approved policy in favor of
'individualizing sentences.' ").
56. See Brian D. Cochran & Eileen C. Cochran, Comment, Appellate Review of Sentences:
A Survey, 17 ST. Louis U. L.J. 221, at 249 (1972).
57. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) ("It is true that a State is not required by the
Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all.").
58. Id
59. For a thorough but slightly outdated review of each state's position on appellate re-
view, see Cochran & Cochran, supra note 56, at 249-62.
60. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) ("That the action of state courts and judi-
cial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a proposition which has long been established by
decisions of this Court."). The incorporation doctrine makes the Bill of Rights applicable to
actions by the states, through the Fourteenth Amendment. JOHN E. NOWAC & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 10.3, at 332 (4th ed. 1991).
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Constitution.6
1. Due Process
Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, neither the state nor
the federal government can deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.62 The Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause guarantees a fair procedure to determine the basis for, and legal-
ity of, such action.63
The Supreme Court has interpreted due process in the sentencing
context to mean that a sentencing judge must exercise "informed discre-
tion."' 6 A judge may not act on "assumptions" that are "materially un-
true."' 6  Procedural due process clearly prohibits judge-made crimes66
and vague laws.67 The Supreme Court has also ruled that penal statutes
should be strictly construed.68 These restrictions on judicial activity
mean that, under a due process analysis, a woman who comes before the
court on a specific charge has the right to receive a sentence for that
particular codified crime; not for being pregnant and engaging in behav-
ior which may harm her fetus. A statute must fairly notify the public
that certain conduct is proscribed; such notice meets due process require-
ments and enhances the deterrent effect of sanctions.69 A statute is void
for vagueness if the conduct it forbids is defined so vaguely that persons
61. See e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (Vacating, on equal protection
grounds, a judge's racially-motivated decision to remove child custody from a white mother
who had married a black man subsequent to her divorce from the child's father, "Private
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them
effect.").
62. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
63. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 60, at 487.
64. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (vacating a sentence based on un-
constitutional prior convictions).
65. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (Vacating a sentence based on misinfor-
mation in a defendant's criminal record; "Such a result, whether caused by carelessness or
design, is inconsistent with due process of the law, and such a conviction cannot stand.").
66. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 243 (1942) ("The unambiguous words of a
statute which imposes criminal penalties are not to be altered by judicial construction so as to
punish one not otherwise within its reach, however deserving of punishment his conduct may
seem."). Many states have codified a prohibition against judicial creation of offenses. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 202 (a) (1979); HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-102(1) (1985); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:1-5(a) (West 1982).
67. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (holding that due process requires
fair notice that criminal law forbids contemplated conduct); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (holding that a criminal statute which is so indefinite that "it encourages
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions" is void for vagueness).
68. Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1980).
69. See Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 546 (1971) (per curiam) (Quoting United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954), which stated that the "underlying principle is that
no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably under-
stand to be proscribed.").
[Vol. 19:235
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"of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application .... ."7 If a vague statute is void, then surely punish-
ment under no statute at all is even more violative of the fair notice that
due process requires.
A judge may try to avoid a due process challenge by claiming, as did
the judge in the Vaughn case,71 that the sentence punishes a drug-related
offense, which allows him or her to consider the circumstances surround-
ing drug use.7 2 A sentencing judge can generally consider all of the ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances of a crime,7' but if fetal danger
due to a high-risk pregnancy (rather than drug use itself, or drug-related
theft) is the basis for the incarceration, then pregnancy is much more
than an aggravating factor. When a judge admittedly grants probation to
similarly charged non-pregnant defendants,74 pregnancy becomes the
entire reason for incarceration. Without the benefit of extensive legisla-
tive hearings, including medical testimony, the judge has created a new
crime which she or he has determined merits a jail term. Due process
requires that this new crime be enacted by a legislature and codified, and
that the prosecution prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, with all of the procedural safeguards traditionally granted to
criminal defendants. 75 A judge who incarcerates pregnant women be-
cause she or he believes their behavior may harm fetal health has not
70. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). The prohibition
against vagueness is particularly strong when the "uncertainty induced by the statute [or lack
thereof] threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights." Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 391 (1979) (invalidating vague statutory provisions which criminalize
certain abortion procedures).
71. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
72. A judge would act inconsistently if she or he applied a fetal harm theory only to the
use of illegal drugs, because many types of legal behavior can harm fetal health, including
alcohol and tobacco use, the use of medications to treat epilepsy or cancer, failure to follow a
healthy diet, and exposure to toxic substances in the environment. These exposures often com-
bine to produce an unhealthy fetal environment, making the cause of harm difficult to deter-
mine. See Diana Kronstadt, Complex Developmental Issues of Prenatal Drug Exposure, I THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN 38 (1991) (factors affecting fetal health are difficult to separate); Drug
Treatment Issues, supra note 44, at 31-32 (some legal medications and practices help a woman
but may harm her fetus).
73. Aggravating factors are circumstances surrounding a crime which add to the defend-
ants guilt and increase the defendant's length of incarceration. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
60 (5th ed. 1979). In contrast, mitigating factors are extenuating circumstances which lessen
the defendant's guilt and reduce the defendant's length of punishment. Id at 903-04. See also
Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1959) (holding that sentencing judge properly
considered factors surrounding a kidnapping in determining the appropriate sentence).
74. See supra notes 4-13 and accompanying text. Judges Wolf and Golde admittedly base
their sentences on a defendant's pregnancy status.
75. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) (holding due process requires at least a
"beyond a resonable doubt" standard for criminal convictions); see generally NOWACK & RO-
TUNDA, supra note 60, at 497-98.
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proved any codified crime "beyond a reasonable doubt," and therefore
violates due process.
Even if the Supreme Court holds that incarceration based on drug
use during pregnancy falls within a judge's sentencing discretion, a judge
would still have to refrain from relying on untested assumptions in mak-
ing his or her decision. The Court has used a due process rationale to
invalidate the use of irrebuttable presumptions about people who seek
legal protection of important rights. For example, in Cleveland Board of
Education v. La~leur, the Court struck down mandatory maternity leave
regulations because they were based on the irrebuttable presumption that
pregnant women could not teach effectively: "while the regulations no
doubt represent a good-faith attempt to achieve a laudable goal, they
cannot pass muster under the Due Process Clause... because they em-
ploy irrebuttable presumptions that unduly penalize a female teacher for
deciding to bear a child."76 The Court's decision required the school to
seek an individualized determination by a doctor regarding each preg-
nant teacher's continuing fitness to teach.77
The same argument should apply to pregnant drug dependent wo-
men: it is impermissible to presume that they need to be incarcerated in
order to save their fetuses without at least a full inquiry into each wo-
man's circumstances and the health benefits or detriments of the particu-
lar incarceration environment she faces. As in Cleveland,78 the judge
must show some rational basis to justify the presumption that incarcera-
tion is beneficial to a particular woman's health and pregnancy. In most,
if not all, incarceration situations, the converse is true.79 The judge
would also have to support the presumption that the woman's drug use,
and not one of many other possible factors, posed harm to the fetus.s0
Due process protections also apply when judges remove custody of
newborn or older children from an incarcerated woman solely because
the woman presently suffers from drug addiction."1 Since the right to
raise one's own children is fundamental, due process requires a full, indi-
vidualized inquiry into a person's parenting ability before termination of
parental custody. 2 Federal law requires child welfare agencies to pro-
vide services designed to keep families together before terminating paren-
76. 414 U.S. 632, 648 (1974).
77. Id. at 644.
78. Id. at 643.
79. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 1 (regarding the difficulty of distinguishing between the many causes of
fetal harm, including a lack of prenatal care) and infra note 140 (regarding adverse effects of
paternal behavior); see also Gideon Koren et. al., Bias Against the Null Hypothesis: The Repro-
ductive Hazards of Cocaine, 2 LANCET 1440 (1989) (reporting on the difficulty of publishing
studies which show negligible effects of cocaine use on pregnancy outcomes, as compared to
studies which show a strong adverse affects, which are more likely to be published).
81. See In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cf. App. 1989).
82. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
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tal custody."3 This is the kind of narrow intervention, based on a
particularized inquiry into family needs, which due process would allow.
Judge Wolf permitted Brenda Vaughn to keep her child,14 but many in-
carcerated women find custody severed on the basis of drug use during
pregnancy.85 Moreover, some incarcerated women "are encouraged to
give up for adoption children that are born in prison" whether or not
they will be fit to raise a child after incarceration. 6 In addition to rais-
ing due process concerns, this situation unnecessarily contributes to the
problems of an overburdened foster care system and the children it tries
to serve.87
To a lesser degree than incarceration, civil confinement of a person
to mandatory medical treatment facilities requires stringent due process
protections. The Supreme Court, recognizing "that civil commitment for
any purpose constitutes a significant depriviation [sic] of liberty and stig-
matizes the individual,"88 has required that commitment criteria be es-
tablished by "clear and convincing" evidence.89 In Vitek v. Jones,90 the
Court held that when a prison seeks to confine a prisoner to a mental
hospital involuntarily, the following civil commitment procedures must
be provided: written notice; a hearing; an opportunity to present testi-
mony of witnesses and to confront and cross-examine adversarial wit-
nesses; an independent decisionmaker; a written statement by the
factfinder of the evidence and reasons for the decision; free legal counsel
for indigent persons; and effective and timely notice of these rights.9"
These safeguards restrict the power of a sentencing judge to arbitrarily
confine a pregnant defendant to a hospital or drug treatment facility.
Substantive due process requires an analysis of whether incarcera-
tion imposed for behavior during pregnacy burdens the "fundamental"
83. See Charlotte B. McCullough, The Child Welfare Response, I THE FUTUJRE OF CHIL-
DREN, 61, 62 (1991) (Explaining the effects of Pub. L. No. 96-272, which requires child welfare
agencies "to make reasonable efforts to prevent a child's placement in foster care and, if foster
care is necessary, to reunite the family.").
84. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Lewis, Attorney for Brenda Vaughn (Oct. 17, 1990).
85. See In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Ct. App. 1989); see also Paltrow, supra note 41,
at 90 (reporting that even inaccurate drug tests have caused authorities to remove custody of
children from their mothers).
86. See Kathleen Haley, Note, Mothers Behind Bars: A Look at the Parental Rights of
Incarcerated Women, 4 NEW ENG. J. PRISON L. 141, 152 (1977); see also McHugh, supra note
24, at 237.
87. See McCullough, supra note 83, at 63 (describing an overburdened foster care
system).
88. Grant H. Morris, The Supreme Court Examines Civil Commitment Issues: A Retro-
spective and Prospective Assessment, 60 TUL. L. REv. 927, 939 (1986) (citing Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979)).
89. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
90. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
91. Id. at 494-95.
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right to choose "whether to bear or beget a child."92 Under modem sub-
stantive due process theory, courts must apply strict scrutiny to govern-
mental deprivations of rights which the Supreme Court has deemed
fundamental.9 3 A woman's decision "whether to bear or beget a child" is
a fundamental right protected, by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, from government interference which does not meet
the strict scrutiny test.94 Under a strict scrutiny analysis, if a woman
decides to carry a pregnancy to term, even though she engages in behav-
ior which may harm the fetus, the government still may not burden that
choice absent a compelling interest served by the least burdensome
means.9" While a judge may have a compelling interest in fetal health,
particularly after viability,96 it seems clear that less burdensome ways
exist than to incarcerate pregnant women.97 Voluntary drug treatment
and pre-natal care are the most obvious examples. 98
2. Fundamental Rights: A Closer Look at the Privacy Decisions
When a judge incarcerates female defendants for the uncodified
crime of drug use during pregnancy, but gives much lighter sentences to
similarly charged non-pregnant drug users, that judge burdens the right
to carry a pregnancy to term by forcing a woman to choose between
abortion and pregnancy in jail or prison.99 The protection against undue
burdens on one's choice whether or not to bear a child stems from a
92. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
93. See NOWACK & ROTUNDA, supra note 60, at 393.
94. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
95. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (invalidating a statute providing
for compulsory sterilization of persons convicted three times of certain felonies, noting the
need for strict scrutiny when fundamental rights such as procreation are at stake).
96. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 519-20 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion) (compelling interest in fetal health begins at viability).
97. Minnesota law requires mandatory civil commitment for pregnant women who refuse
treatment services. See Steven & Ahlstrom, supra note 41, at 95-96. However, many respected
medical and social service experts advise against these coercive measures which they believe
will deter pregnant women from initially seeking any treatment at all for fear of losing their
liberty and their children. See Recommendations, 1 THE FUTuRE OF CHILDREN, 8, 15 (1991).
Moreover, such statutes would have to be very narrowly drafted and enforced to protect
against all of the constitutional challenges outlined in this Note.
98. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (citing evidence showing the lack of appro-
priate drug treatment programs for pregnant women). A judge may also order drug treatment
programs to admit pregnant women, if applicable statutes require equal access to public ac-
comodations, including private facilities which offer their services to the public. See Drug
Treatment Issues, supra note 44, at 15 (describing a lawsuit brought by the ACLU against four
private alcohol and drug treatment programs in New York City which allegedly discriminate
against pregnant women, in violation of New York's statute proscribing discrimination by
facilities serving the general public).
99. See generally Roberts, supra note 18, at 1458 (arguing that incarcerating pregnant
women for behavior which may harm the fetus punishes them for having babies; this punish-
ment is almost exclusively reserved for women of color).
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substantive due process "fundamental rights" theory °° which is gener-
ally called the right to privacy. '
The argument that a judge can rightfully sentence a woman to
prison for drug use during pregnancy is based on a theory that the fetus
has rights apart from, and sometimes more important than, the pregnant
woman's rights. 0 2  For example, Judge Wolf of the Vaughn case3
viewed the fetus as a member of the "public" when he argued that his
sentence was within statutory sentencing limits. This is a difficult argu-
ment to make while Roe v. Wade"0 remains valid law.
In Roe, the Court explicitly rejected the argument that the state had
a compelling interest, even after viability, in protecting the fetus as a
"person" as that term is used in the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 5 Roe
held that the state could regulate the abortion right during the second
trimester only if necessary to protect the health of the woman, and dur-
ing the third trimester to protect the viability of the fetus only if the life
or health of the woman would not be impaired by such restrictions. 106
Furthermore, in Doe v. Bolton 1 07 the Court explicitly noted that, in de-
ciding whether to perform an abortion, doctors must be allowed to take
into account the "emotional, psychological, [and] familial" factors of the
woman's situation. 1 8 Roe and Doe still have important precedential
value, although the recent case of Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv-
ices"° displays ominous signs about the future of abortion rights.110
The holdings in Roe, Doe, Eisenstadt and Skinner support a wo-
man's right to procreate without a judge punishing her for that choice on
100. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the right to decide whether or
not to terminate a pregnancy is primarily based on the Fourteenth Amendment).
101. i d (explaining that the right to privacy protects the abortion decision from undue
governmental burdens); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that the
involuntary sterilization of criminals violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
102. See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy,
and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 447 n.129 (1983) (arguing that pregnant women should
have a legal "duty to avoid... harmful activities in case she decides not to abort"); see also
Barbara Shelley, Maternal Substance Abuse The Next Step in the Protection of Fetal Rights?,
92 DICK. L. REV. 691 (1988) (advocating criminal liability for maternal behavior which in-
jures the fetus).
103. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
104. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
105. Id at 157.
106. Id at 164-65.
107. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
108. Id. at 192.
109. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
110. Id. The Court in Webster allowed states to limit the use of public facilities for abor-
tions. Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion supported the requirement of expensive
tests on women seeking abortions in order to protect possibly viable fetuses. Id. at 519-20
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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the basis of potential harm to the fetus. Judicial punishment of certain
behavior during pregnancy, unsupported by conclusive facts or statutory
authority, would not stand up to the strict scrutiny analysis applied to
fundamental rights violations."' 1 Judicial attempts at prescribing medi-
cal treatment via sentencing severely burden women's reproductive
choices because incarcerated women are in the unique situation of having
all their reproductive functions controlled by the state. They are not gen-
erally free to leave prison to seek their own nutrition, medical treatment
and other services. -When prison personnel fail to meet prisoners' medi-
cal needs, resulting deprivations of basic health services are unconstitu-
tional because women retain their fundamental rights as long as those
rights are not inconsistent with prison security.' 1 2
Judges who jail women for drug use during pregnancy essentially
view a woman as a vessel for the fetus. By depriving pregnant women of
freedom, economic opportunities or other "emotional, psychological,
[and] familial" factors' 13 because of fetal rights, judges replace women's
autonomy rights with their own concern for the fetus. Roe held that this
type of substitution is prohibited during the first and second trimesters of
pregnancy, and limited in the third trimester to situations evidencing a
compelling state interest (for example, if the fetus can be carried to term
without harm to the woman's health). 14 A plurality in the Webster case
found a compelling state interest at viability." 5 At most, therefore, there
may be a legal argument for restricting a woman's post-viability activity
if it damages fetal health, but even such an argument might fail upon
consideration of the woman's "emotional, psychological, [and] familial"
factors, since incarceration severely implicates all three.'" 6 Furthermore,
such intervention is unlikely to improve fetal health because most drug-
exposure damage is done in the first trimester'"7 (often before a woman is
aware of her pregnancy' 1), and because incarceration is often bad for the
fetus as well as the woman." 9
111. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
112. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
113. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
114. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973). Although fetal rights advocates may argue
that once a woman decides to carry a fetus to term, Roe should not apply because she chooses
to lend her body to protect the fetus from all possible harm (including abortion), the constitu-
tional support for this argument is highly speculative. See Robertson, supra note 102 and
accompanying text (arguing for a legal duty of care); see also Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Inva-
sions and Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1987)
(arguing against a legal duty of care).
115. Webster, 492 U.S. at 519-20 (plurality opinion).
116. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 192; see supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
117. McNulty, supra note 2, at 318-19.
118. See Combinations of Drugs Taken by Pregnant Women Add to Problems in Determin-
ing Fetal Damage, 261 JAMA 1694 (1989) (noting that pregnancy may not be diagnosed for
several months, by which time damage to the fetus may have actually occurred).
119. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
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Incarceration for the sake of the fetus is analogous to forcing medi-
cal treatment on a pregnant woman for the sake of the fetus. The
Supreme Court has recognized the right of competent persons to be free
from unwanted medical treatment. 120 The Court has not specifically ad-
dressed the issue of forced medical treatment of pregnant women to en-
hance fetal health. A recent Washington, D.C. Court of Appeals
decision, however, held that, except for "truly extraordinary or compel-
ling reasons," it would be unconstitutional for a court to order a
ceasarean section on women who refused such treatment.121
Under the privacy rubric, it seems clear that protecting the taxpay-
ing public 122 is not a sufficiently compelling state goal to justify invading
Fourteenth Amendment rights, particularly because there are less costly,
more effective, and more narrowly tailored means to achieve the goal of
having fewer drug-exposed infants relying on the public welfare
system. 123
3. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment124
guarantees all individuals equal governmental treatment in the exercise
of their rights. 125 Governmental classifications based on race, national
origin and alienage require strict scrutiny, which means that the govern-
ment must have a compelling interest, and use the least restrictive means
of achieving it, to justify treating such classes of 'people differently. 126
Classifications based on gender require intermediate scrutiny, which
means they must bear a substantial relationship to "important govern-
mental objectives."' 127
120. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (declaring the right to refuse invasive
procedures on one's body).
121. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1247 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990). In this case, a woman dying of
cancer allegedly refused a ceasarean section, as did her family. The trial court hurriedly ap-
proved a court-order sought by the hospital to perform a ceasarean section. Both the woman
and the fetus died within a matter of days. The appellate court issued a post-mortem opinion
that the order was invalid without evidence that either the woman consented to the procedure,
or that her inability to give informed consent resulted in a careful substituted judgment proce-
dure granting consent. Id at 1252.
122. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (quoting Judge Wolf's argument that the
"taxpaying public" needs protection from women whose drug use creates costly infant-care
problems).
123. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text (regarding comparative costs of incar-
ceration and treatment).
124. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
125. The source of equal protection against federal governmental action is the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The analysis applied is identical to that applied under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See NOWACK & ROTUNDA, supra note 60, at 569.
126. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S.
633, 644-46 (1948).
127. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 128 Justice O'Connor,
writing for the majority, stated that a party seeking to uphold a statute
that classifies by gender carries "the burden of showing an 'exceedingly
persuasive justification' for the classification."' 129 This burden, she con-
tinued, is met "only by showing at least that the classification serves 'im-
portant governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objec-
tives.' "'' Since the Court scrutinizes the application of a policy and not
merely the state's articulated goals, if the means chosen do not serve the
intended ends, the classification may have resulted from "the mechanical
application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper
roles of men and women."'131
As a practical matter, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is
gender discrimination, because only women get pregnant. Under the
law, however, the argument that pregnancy-based discrimination is gen-
der discrimination rests on uncertain constitutional ground. In the 1974
case of Geduldig v. Aiello, 132 the Supreme Court held that pregnant em-
ployees seeking disability benefits for pregnancy could not do so under
the equal protection clause. 33 In Geduldig, the Court viewed pregnancy
as a health "risk," affecting some but not all women, for which the state
was not required to provide protection;134 according to the Court, since
women could collect benefits for the same "risks" as men, the challenged
policy did not discriminate on the basis of gender.135
In 1982, Congress added the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to Title
VII to include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy within the statu-
tory prohibition against employment-based gender discrimination. 136 It
is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court, prior to enact-
ment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, had already held that Title
VII proscribed employment practices which clearly burdened pregnant
women. 1
37
128. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
129. Id. at 724 (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)).
130. Id. at 724 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
131. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982).
132. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
133. Id. at 494-95.
134. Id. at 496-97.
135. Id. at 496-97 n.20.
136. Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1981)); for a comprehensive discussion of the newest workplace pregnancy discrimination
issue, see Ellen Bigge, Comment, The Fetal Rights Controversy: A Resurfacing of Sex Discrimi-
nation in the Guise of Fetal Protection, 57 UMKC L. Rnv. 261, 271 (1989).
137. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 138-43 (1977) (striking down, on Title
VII grounds, a policy which deprived women of their earned seniority benefits if they took
maternity leave and subsequently returned to work).
Fall 1991] INCARCERATING PREGNANT, DRUG-USING DEFENDANTS 253
Although it is unclear whether the Supreme Court would apply this
pregnancy discrimination analysis to cases beyond the Title VII (employ-
ment) context, the Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty 138 case raises the possibility
that a clearly burdensome type of pregnancy discrimination, such as in-
carceration, might violate the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, in a
footnote to his majority Geduldig opinion, Justice Stewart noted:
While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not
follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a
sex-based classification .... Absent a showing that distinctions
involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidi-
ous discrimination against the members of one sex or the other,
lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude preg-
nancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reason-
able basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition. 139
This language could be interpreted to narrow Geduldig to fact situations
in which women are perceived as asking for extra benefits, as opposed to
being unequally and unreasonably burdened by the duty to create a risk-
free fetal environment. Evidence that men are not penalized or detained
through incarceration for the duration of a partner's pregnancy,
although paternal drug use, battering, and other behavior can adversely
affect fetal health, would support an equal protection challenge. 14°
The Supreme Court would probably reject a race-based equal pro-
tection challenge to the incarceration of pregnant drug-users. The Court
has required a showing of discriminatory intent, and not just discrimina-
tory impact, by the government before it will strike down state action on
equal protection grounds.141
Women of color may, nevertheless, be able to prove a prima facie
case of discriminatory purpose by showing that broad sentencing discre-
tion has produced unexplained racial disparities, following the reasoning
of Castaneda v. Partida.142 In that case, the Court held that a defendant
successfully demonstrated a prima facie case of intentional discrimina-
tion in grand jury selections by showing a sufficiently large statistical dis-
138. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
139. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20 (emphasis added).
140. Men can harm fetuses by providing drugs to pregnant partners or by otherwise expos-
ing the fetus to harmful or toxic substances, and by beating a woman during her pregnancy,
which happens to one out of twelve women, according to one source. Katha Pollit, Fetal
Rights: A New Assault on Feminism, THE NATION, Mar. 26, 1990, at 409, 416. A father's
behavior prior to conception also influences fetal health. See Fetuses Weigh Less if Father
Smokes, 111 NEW SciENTisT, Aug. 28, 1986, at 19 (smoking damages fetal health); see also
Ruth E. Little, Association of Father's Drinking and Infant's Birth Weight, 314 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1644 (1986); Andrew Purvis, The Sins of the Fathers, TIME, Nov. 26, 1990, at 90 (effects
of drinking on fetal health); Cocaine Binds to Sperm in Lab Study, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 9, 1991,
at A2 (raising concerns about fathers' contributions to fetal damage). '
141. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1976).
142. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
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parity between the percentage of Mexican-Americans in the population
and the percentage summoned, combined with a highly discretionary se-
lection procedure. 143
Black or Native American women would be able to demonstrate sta-
tistics showing that women in their racial groups are much more likely to
be incarcerated for drug use during pregnancy than white women, de-
spite studies showing similar patterns of drug use.1" A challenge based
on racial disparity would probably have to include a comparison between
the percentage of female defendants of a particular race that is sentenced
by a particular judge, and the percentage that is tested and incarcerated
for drug use during pregnancy.
4. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The most common basis for review of sentences is the allegation that
a sentence is so disproportionate to a crime that it constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 45 The Eighth
Amendment applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.'" The argument that drug addiction is a dis-
ease 147 supports a theory that drug use combined with pregnancy should
serve as a mitigating factor in sentencing, because punishing someone for
the status of being addicted has been recognized by the Supreme Court as
cruel and unusual punishment within the Eighth Amendment. 141 Under
Robinson v. California, the status of addiction cannot be punished absent
some criminal act. 49 The Court noted, however, that states have the
power to compel treatment for addicts, with incarceration as a penalty
for non-compliance.1 50 In 1968, the Supreme Court narrowed Robinson
by holding that a state could criminally punish a person for being drunk
in public."' Today, addicted persons fill our jails 52 because they are
143. Id. at 494-97.
144. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (holding that a life imprisonment sen-
tence under a South Dakota recidivist statute, in which defendant wrote a bad check for
$100.00, constituted cruel and unusual punishment).
146. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
147. See Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (recognizing drug addiction as a
disease).
148. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
149. The Court analogized: "It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would
attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted
with a venereal disease." Id. at 666.
150. Id. at 665.
151. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968) (plurality opinion questioning the defend-
ant's inability to avoid drinking and appearing drunk in public, and expressing concern about
limiting the state's power to handle social problems). See Dawn M. Korver, Note, The Consti-
tutionality of Punishing Pregnant Substance Abusers Under Drug Trafficking Laws: The
Criminalization of a Bodily Function, 32 B.C. L. REv. 629, 652-54 (1991).
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convicted on specific charges (e.g. possession of drugs or drug trafficking)
rather than on their status per se.
The Model Penal Code provides guidance as to what constitutes an
"act" within the reach of criminal liability."5 3 The Model Penal Code
states that involuntary bodily movements, meaning those which do not
result from a person's effort or determination, are excluded from the defi-
nition of "voluntary act" and thus cannot be punished as criminal
acts. 154 Liability, however, may be imposed for the volitional act of driv-
ing, or otherwise acting, with knowledge of the likelihood that harm of
criminal dimension may result (such as reckless endangerment).!"
Although one could argue that becoming pregnant is often a "voluntary
act," the medical changes which accompany becoming pregnant are, to a
large extent, beyond a woman's control.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines do not specifically refer to drug
use during pregnancy. The guidelines state that, although mental, emo-
tional or physical conditions are not "ordinarily relevant" in determining
whether a sentence should deviate from the guideline, "an extraordinary
physical impairment may be a reason to impose a sentence other than
imprisonment." '56 The guidelines also recommend that sentences for
drug users include mandatory participation in an appropriate treatment
program.1 57 These two recommendations could support an argument
that judges should sentence pregnant women to supervised release or
probation contingent upon participation in an appropriate treatment pro-
gram, because pregnancy is an "extraordinary physical impairment" un-
suited to incarceration. One could interpret further support for this
argument from the Commission's comment that "family ties and respon-
sibilities" may be relevant in sentencing when probation is an option.1 58
The prohibition against punishing the status of being ill arguably
applies to the dual status of being pregnant and addicted to drugs, since
both of these conditions can be viewed as "involuntary" bodily func-
tions.15 9 Punishing pregnancy is doubly problematic because of its "fun-
152. See generally Michael B. Getty, Alternative Sentencing for the Alcohol/Drug Defend-
ant, 14 S. ILL. U. LJ. 1 (1989) (analyzing attempts to get addicted prisoners out of prison and
into treatment).
153. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.2 (2d ed. 1986)
(discussing the MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.01(1), and the definition of an "act" for criminal law
purposes).
154. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.01(2)(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
155. LAFAvE & ScOTr, supra note 153, at 199.
156. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 275-76,
§ 5H1.3-.4 (West 1991).
157. Id at 276, § 5H1.4.
158. Id at 276-77, § 5HI.6.
159. Since deciding Robinson and Powell, the Court has denied certiorari to cases raising
the issues of status defenses. See Korver, supra note 151, at 654 nn. 207-08 and accompanying
text.
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damental right" protection against undue governmental burdens, under a
substantive due process rubric."6° However, if one believes that a wo-
man's pregnancy and drug use are completely voluntary acts, the Eighth
Amendment challenge fails. Certainly, on a policy level, one can force-
fully argue that addiction, especially during pregnancy, should be a miti-
gating factor in sentencing.16 1
To ensure against cruel and unusual punishment during incarcera-
tion, the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley established for incarcerated
persons the right to certain minimal conditions of health and safety. 62
At the same time, the Court has underscored that when balancing consti-
tutional rights and security concerns, "the choice made by corrections
officials - which is, after all, a judgment 'peculiarly within [their] prov-
ince and professional expertise,'.., should not be lightly set aside by the
courts."' 63 Yet when security is not an issue, it is clear that there is a
constitutional right of prisoners to adequate medical care, under Estelle
v. Gamble. "I
The Supreme Court would probably interpret a pattern of depriving
women prisoners of adequate prenatal care, including drug treatment or
other essential services, as cruel and unusual punishment. 6 ' In Califor-
nia, Legal Services for Prisoners with Children challenged inadequate
health care for women prisoners; the settlement of these suits, which re-
lied on the Eighth Amendment, has effected more medical services in
prisons and jails.'66
IV. Alternative Sentencing for Drug Addicts
Commentators familiar with the shortcomings of incarceration in
addressing the needs of drug addicted defendants sometimes suggest "al-
ternative sentencing."' 6 7 Alternative sentence advocates perceive drug
addiction as a medical problem which must be treated in a therapeutic
160. See supra notes 60-123 and accompanying text (for due process and privacy analyses).
161. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (regarding the adverse effects of punish-
ment on maternal and fetal health).
162. 42 U.S. 78 (1987).
163. Id. at 92-93 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
164. 429 U.S. 97, 103-05 (1976).
165. See Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,
349 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that denial of elective abortions constituted "deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs" in violation of the Eighth Amendment), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006
(1988).
166. Yeager v. Smith (No. CV-F-87-493-REC, Fed. Dist. Ct., California) (settlement ap-
proved October 3, 1989); Jones v. Dyer (No. H-114544-0, Alameda County Superior Court,
California) (settlement approved November 3, 1989); Harris v. McCarthy (NO. 85-6002-
JGD). For more detailed information about these cases and subsequent developments contact
Ellen Barry, Director, Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, 1535 Mission Street, San
Francisco, CA 94103, (415) 255-7036.
167. See generally Getty, supra note 152.
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environment not often found in jails or prisons. Some state legislatures
have granted prosecutors the statutory power to recommend treatment
alternatives for drug-using defendants. 16 For example, the California
alternative sentencing statute169 gives prosecuting attorneys the power to
determine defendants' eligibility for education, treatment or rehabilita-
tion programs instead of incarceration. In determining eligibility, prose-
cutors must follow certain guidelines: the defendant must be charged
with violating one of the enumerated offenses involving possession of
drugs for personal use, the defendant must not have been convicted of a
previous drug charge, the present charge cannot involve drug-related vio-
lence, the defendant must not have prior felony convictions or prior un-
successful diversion program experience within five years, and the
defendant must not have had prior revocation of parole or probation.170
Under the California system, the sentencing court makes the final
decision whether to divert the defendant into treatment based on the pre-
sentence investigation and "any other information considered by the
court to be relevant to its decision."' 171 Once diversion is granted, it can
be revoked on motion of the probation department, after which the court
has a hearing to decide whether to resume criminal proceedings.172 Con-
versely, if the defendant successfully completes a diversion program, the
court dismisses all criminal charges. 173 Another advantage for the de-
fendant is that no statement made during the diversion investigation pro-
cess can be used against him or her in any subsequent proceedings. 174
The most effective diversion program would train judges and law-
yers involved in the area of criminal law to look for signs of drug addic-
tion among all defendants who come before them.175 The purpose of this
inquiry would not be to aggravate a sentence, as in the Vaughn case, but
to determine whether an addict, pregnant or not, is eligible for voluntary
drug treatment. Voluntary treatment would ensure that limited re-
sources would be spent on drug users who are ready to recover from
addiction. Only when society has the resources to enroll all needy de-
fendants in suitable programs should legislators begin to discuss how to
help unwilling addicts (without violating their constitutional rights to lib-
erty and autonomy). An offender who poses a present physical threat to
168. Id
169. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1000-1000.5 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991); see Getty, supra note
152, at 6-9 nn.29-44 and accompanying text (discussing the statute).
170. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000(a)(1)-(a)(6).
171. Id. § 1000.2.
172. Id. § 1000.3.
173. Id
174. Id § 1000.1(c).
175. The National Association for Perinatal Addiction Research and Education
(NAPARE), based in Chicago, has a seminar project to educate judges about perinatal addic-
tion and custody matters. Contact Ira Chasnoff, M.D., President, at (312) 329-2512 for more
information.
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other people should be locked up while undergoing treatment, but a con-
victed, non-violent person like Brenda Vaughn should be allowed to at-
tend a program suited to her needs as a pregnant addict. Because many
drug addicted women live in dangerous, unhealthy environments, resi-
dential treatment often offers the most hope for recovery. 176 California's
Mother-Infant Care Program for low-risk prisoners allows certain preg-
nant women and women with young children to serve their sentences at
halfway houses, where they can live with their children while they serve
their sentences. 117 An ideal program might provide a combination of
drug-treatment, job skills, and parenting training with an on-site child
care component for a woman's dependent older children.
If a defendant, convicted of a specified crime, chooses drug treat-
ment, a drug probation system could be set up to ensure that she makes
significant progress toward recovery for the duration of her treatment,
the length and scope of which could be determined by a panel of several
judges, defense and prosecution attorneys, and treatment providers, in-
cluding prenatal care providers. The treatment should not exceed the
duration of the applicable criminal sentence, unless the defendant desires
treatment to continue. If the same multi-disciplinary panel decides,
through proper hearing procedures, that the defendant has not benefit-
ted, and will not benefit, from the treatment, a judge may restore the
original sentence (as long as it meets basic health care needs), minus time
served during treatment. Given the choice between prison and a suitable,
supportive treatment program, it is very likely that Vaughn would have
chosen a treatment program.
Conclusion
A woman should not be brought into the criminal justice system
simply because she is pregnant and addicted, without having been
charged with a specific, codified crime. A woman's status as a pregnant
addict is a serious problem which the government should treat with more
appropriate action such as medical and drug treatment outreach
programs.
When a pregnant woman commits a crime, she is subject to court
jurisdiction. Like other defendants, however, she has constitutional pro-
tections which limit the factors upon which her sentence can be based.
Public policy dictates that a judge should consider pregnancy (and any
other medical condition), when sentencing an addicted woman; that
176. See Drug Treatment Issues, supra note 44, at 36-38 (describing the violence and other
problems which impair women's recoveries, and the necessity of treatment programs specifi-
cally designed for women).
177. See Sandra Bodovitz, Settlement Will Assist Jailed Moms with Kids, THE RECORDER,
May 30, 1990, at 1 (describing a settlement between Legal Services for Prisoners with Children
and the California Department of Corrections aimed at fully implementing the program).
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judge, however, may not use the pregnancy to mete out a harsher sen-
tence to that woman than she would expect to receive for her charged
crime. Instead, a judge should fashion a sentence which promotes the
woman's health and fetal health without sacrificing the woman's consti-
tutional rights.

